afresh questions about the constitutional limits of judicial reform of the criminal law, i.e. "judicial activism".
The majority of this paper is dedicated to presenting an account of PAL's development through the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries (Parts II-VI). Part VII explains briefly why this alternative history clears the way to seeing the constitutional concern raised by Jogee.
Before moving further, two caveats must be noted. First, most reported cases relevant to PAL involve homicide. The attendant rules on felony murder could thus have a distorting effect until their abolition in 1957.
14 Secondly, the defendant was only permitted to speak in his defence in all cases by section 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. Beforehand, the ability of the courts to assess the defendant's "subjective" thought processes was limited, and thus reliance on "objective" factors was more commonplace. It is submitted that, if these caveats are borne in mind, it remains possible to doubt the Supreme Court/Privy Council's history of PAL.
II. THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
The sixteenth century law on accessorial liability was undeveloped, 15 but an early version of PAL is detectable. 16 In R. v Salisbury 17 a servant joined in a fight involving his master (Offence A). During the fight, the master killed another combatant (Offence B) . 18 The servant was ignorant of his master's pre-existing plan to commit murder. 19 The servant was held liable for manslaughter, because he was ignorant of the murderous plan, and also lacked the "malice prepense" 20 required for murder. This decision was generous. 21 In the mid-sixteenth century, the sole question appears to have been whether the collateral offending -even if unforeseeable -occurred in pursuit of the parties' common unlawful purpose. For example, in R. v Herbert, 22 a group was assembled by Herbert to steal from and fight Mansell, but apparently did not intend to kill anyone. A disturbance ensued, and a stone thrown by a member of Herbert's group (aimed at someone else) killed Mansell's sister. Half of the judges 23 thought that Herbert's group was liable for her murder, given its connection to their initial unlawful purpose. In essence, "if a man takes the risk of doing an unlawful act, he must take all the consequences of that act even though he had neither intended nor foreseen them". 24 For the remaining judges, the group was liable for murder only if it was proved that Mansell's sister had come in defence of her brother, binding the murder to the group's initial unlawful purpose. If Mansell's sister had not sided with either party, then her death was a separate incident, and Herbert's group could be liable, at most, for manslaughter. The evidence could not resolve this factual issue, but the law was clear. 25 Importantly, it is implicit in the approach of both groups of judges that, had the initial purpose of Herbert's group been lawful, there would not have been liability for murder or manslaughter, at least without evidence of actual encouragement or assistance being given to the stone thrower.
26
The judges' approach in Herbert is consistent with PAL. A party to a common unlawful purpose could be liable for a collateral offence despite not intentionally assisting or encouraging it -the distinguishing mark of PAL. The reaches of this early PAL doctrine are, nevertheless, unclear. In murder cases, the felony murder rule removed any need for proof of fault with regard to killing. 27 Even if no felony were commanded, however, a collateral murder would be the responsibility of all parties to the common purpose. 28 Furthermore, although those who commanded "beatings" were responsible for collateral murders, an intention to beat was sufficient mens rea for murder at the time. 29 Examples not involving murder are thus more useful.
One rare example of a (hypothetical) case not involving murder is provided in commanded robbery (Offence A), and more severe violence was used against the victim (Offence B), the commander was liable for both offences. 32 No explanation regarding the connection between the offences is given, so no intention to encourage Offence B is mentioned.
Plowden's "distinct things" lacked a "connection or affinity" with the secondary party's command. 33 For instance, if the defendant specified that V1's house should be burned and the principal deliberately burned down V2's house, the defendant would not be a secondary party to the property damage. The principal's offence would be "another distinct thing, to which [the commander] gave no assent nor command". 34 Similarly, if the parties'
original unlawful purpose was accomplished, and the collateral offence occurred afterwards, distinct evidence of assistance or encouragement in relation to the collateral offence had to be proved.
35
It is not clear how far beyond commanding (counselling and procuring, in modern terms) 36 Plowden's comments went, or what the "assent" he referred to involved. These points do not harm the thesis that PAL existed in the sixteenth century. It did not appear necessary for there to be, even in homicide cases, a common purpose to additionally resist by force opposition to the plan, although brief references to such resolutions appear. 37 As will be seen below, the common purpose to resist opposition was to reappear at various points in history, and was capitalised upon in Jogee.
III. THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
The focus on collateral offence committed in pursuit of the parties' common purpose was maintained, as far as the reported sources suggest, in the early-to-mid seventeenth century authorities -beyond, it appears, procurement cases: "when several men joyn in an unlawful act they are all guilty of whatever happens upon it… For a man must take heed how he joineth Here, there is no common unlawful purpose, and so even the nascent PAL doctrine recognised in the sixteenth century would be inapplicable: actual assistance or encouragement of the murder (presumably provided intentionally) would be required in such a case.
5. Whether a person, knowing of the design of another to lie in wait to assault a third person, and accompanying him in that design, if it shall happen that the third person be killed at that time, in the presence of him who knew of that design, and accompanied the other in it, be guilty in law of the same crime with the party who had that design, and killed him, though he had no actual hand in his death?
Ans. If a person is privy to a felonious design, or to a design of committing any personal violence, and accompanieth the party in putting that design in execution, though he may think it will not extend so far as death, but only beating, and hath no personal hand, or doth otherwise contribute to it than by his being with the other person, when he executeth his design of assaulting the party, if the party dieth, they are both guilty of murder. For by his accompanying him in the design, he shews his approbation of it, and gives the party more courage to put it in execution; which is an aiding, abetting, assisting and comforting of him, as laid in the indictment.
The answer to question 5 is reminiscent of the two-offence analysis employed in modern PAL cases. A is intentionally encouraging B only to beat C (Offence A), yet he is liable for C's murder (Offence B) . 40 An intention to beat was, however, sufficient fault for murder at the time, 41 and other seventeenth century authorities suggest that ignorance of the principal's plan to kill might (as in Salisbury) relieve the defendant of secondary liability for murder. 42 Less instructive still is the alternative example where A intentionally encouraged B to commit a felony, because of the felony murder rule. original intention" 45 -could stretch only so far, and its outer limit was, at least in relation to accessories before the fact (counsellors and procurers), probable collateral offending.
46
Importantly, given later developments, Hale maintains that, for principals in the second degree (aiders and abettors), certain collateral offences were presumed to be within the parties' common purpose to commit felonies: if a group embarks on a plan to steal deer, "the law presumes they came all with intent to oppose all that should hinder them in that design, and consequently when one kild the keeper, it is presumed to be the act of all, because pursuant to that intent… tho there were no express intention to kill any person in the first enterprise… the law presumes they come to make good their design against all opposition".
47
If the group's joint purpose was lawful, however, secondary liability for murder required proof it was actually encouraged or assisted. 48 The killing must be in pursuance of that unlawful act, and not collateral to it. As for the purpose, if divers come to hunt in a park, and the keeper commands them to stand, and resists them; if one of the company kills the keeper, it is not only murder in him, but in all the rest then present, that came upon that design, for it was done in pursuance of that unlawful act… But suppose that they coming into the park to hunt, before they see the keeper, there is an accidental quarrel happens amongst them, and one kills the other, it will not be murder but manslaughter; and in the rest that were not concerned in that quarrel it will not be felony.
[ ] The implication is that no knowledge of the principal's further offence was necessary if it was committed in pursuance of a common unlawful purpose. The (in fact) collateral offence was only (in law) a collateral offence if it was not done in pursuance of the initial unlawful purpose. This inclusion of what were, in fact, collateral offences within the parties' "common purpose" was an intellectual dishonesty that was to dog judgments until Chan Wing-Siu.
In R. v Ashton, Holt CJ gave an additional example: "Two, three or more, are doing an unlawful act, as abusing the passers-by in a street or highway, if one of them kill a passer-by it is murder by all". 50 There is no mention of the need for a common plan to commit murder, or even contemplation that murder might happen. Furthermore, there is no felony. There is a simple connection between the unlawful abuse (Offence A) and the murder (Offence B) that flows from it. This is, structurally, reminiscent of PAL. A similar, two-step analysis can be applied to R. v Wallis, where it was suggested that: "If a man begins a riot… and the same riot continue, and an officer is killed, he that began the riot… is a… murderer; though he did not do the fact". 51 Again, liability for Offence B (murder) was imposed on the basis that it was an incident of the common purpose to commit Offence A (affray/rioting).
Assuming the initial common purpose of the parties was illegal, 52 cases involving counsellors and procurers, the focus was thus on what was probable, rather than intended. It must be accepted that, when Foster was writing, probability and intention would have been conceptually closer than they are nowadays, yet Foster distinguishes intention from probability. This unsettles the assumption in Jogee that a "subjective" version of Foster's probability test would be the modern concept of intention. 58 The "subjective" equivalent of "objective" probability, i.e. foreseeability, is presumably "subjective" foresight of the relevant probability, which is (almost) what Chan Wing-Siu endorsed.
The probability test certainly softened the law's approach: a bare felony (robbery) was not enough to affix liability for murder -death had to be a probable result. This perhaps explains an awkward aspect of Foster's account. 59 He cites a 1697 case, where three soldiers went to steal apples. 60 One soldier was confronted by the orchard owner's son and murdered him. The other soldiers were acquitted of murder. They were engaged in "small inconsiderate trespass", and it was not clear that they had a "general resolution against all opposers". 61 This result might appear puzzling: Offence B (murder) seems to have been committed in pursuit of Offence A (stealing apples), and that was enough -it appears -to found secondary liability in the seventeenth century. But the answer to this quandary might be probability -if that test
was to be applied beyond accessories before the fact. In the soldiers' case, murder was not a probable consequence, given the "minor" nature of the common purpose to steal apples. This analysis (which is, it is submitted, less ahistorical than an alternative one based on "conditional intention") could be used to explain away the orchard example, and indeed it later was.
62
By the end of the eighteenth century, then, the question of whether Offence B was a probable consequence of the common intent to commit Offence A had begun to assume importance, most clearly in cases of accessories before the fact, but perhaps also in cases of principals in the second degree. Admittedly, what the parties knew (for example, whether the principal (in the first degree) was armed or not) or had planned was relevant to the probability assessment. 63 The Supreme Court/Privy Council agreed with this general picture in Jogee, 64 but alleged that things changed markedly in the nineteenth century.
V. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
In Jogee, it was contended that:
65
Cases in the nineteenth century showed … a significant change of approach. It was no longer sufficient … to prove that the principal's conduct was a probable consequence, in the ordinary course of things, of the criminal enterprise … The prosecution had to prove that it was part of their common purpose, should the occasion arise.
The Supreme Court/Privy Council is right about the intellectual muddle the courts created in the nineteenth century (finding the collateral offence to be part of the parties' "common purpose" when it was, in fact, a departure from it). That conclusion does not, however, ground a requirement that the defendant had to intend to encourage or assist every one of the was taken by East to entail -but it is significant that even by 1803 the language of "contemplation" was used in relation to secondary liability. As demonstrated below, "contemplation" became very important in the early twentieth century, and was important to
Chan Wing-Siu itself.
During the nineteenth century, the presumption regarding resistance gave way to the necessity of proof that the parties' "common purpose" included such contingencies, 68 but caution must be exercised when pondering whether this required proof that the parties actually shared a common intention. Some authorities might support this jump. In R. v White, it was held that: "if the prisoners came with the same illegal purpose, and both determined to resist, the act of one would fix guilt upon both…". 69 Rather than presuming such a determination existed, the court found that White's running away as soon as the alarm was raised secured his acquittal for the principal's violent crime. The Supreme Court/Privy
Council is thus right insofar as it does appear that the parties would need to be proved to have "determined" to resist opposition with force. But it remains something of a leap from the common "determination" mentioned in White to a discrete intention to assist or encourage all of the principal's offences. It is not certain how far White departed from the earlier probability model. Lawyers at the time still presumed natural and probable consequences of actions to be "intended". 70 It would thus be unwise to read statements about "determination" to be broadly synonymous with intention, and then use that to support a thesis involving the modern understanding of intention.
The concept of a common resolution to resist opposition was opaque. must have "a general resolution against all opposers … whether such resolution appears … to have been actually and explicitly entered into by the confederates, or may be reasonably collected from their number, arms, or behaviour, at or before the scene of the action". 71 The "resolution" to resist opposition could thus be tacit, but it is unclear what such a "resolution" amounted to. If this "resolution" was a synonym for intention, it is noteworthy that the word "resolution" remained unchanged in the text by 1950, 72 when the law's approach to fault elements (and principally intention) had begun to solidify. 73 Significantly, when assessing the Supreme Court/Privy Council's historical view, the common purpose scenario was juxtaposed in the 1819 edition with liability on the basis of having "actually aided and abetted him in the fact", 74 suggesting that PAL was becoming at least a special variety of aiding and abetting, if not a discrete doctrine, by the early nineteenth century.
The cases were similarly unclear about how a common "resolution" to resist opposition was proved. For instance, in R. v Hawkins, 75 some poachers beat up a gamekeeper.
The principal returned later and robbed the gamekeeper. The common purpose was assumed to be "to kill game, and perhaps to resist the keepers". 76 The use of the word perhaps suggests that, even when violence was actually used, the courts might not find that a common purpose to use it had existed, but this idea is not explored further.
Aside from concerns over what a common "resolution" to resist opposition involved, and how it was to be proved, it was not always insisted upon. In Redford v. Birley and Others, Holroyd J noted that if a group's purpose was lawful, it would not be liable for the principal's crimes unless actual aiding and abetting were proved, but:
77
If persons go together, go united in an unlawful design, to commit a felony, or a breach of the peace, and, in the course of effecting that purpose any one does an act in pursuit of the common purpose, they are all answerable because that which they set about, upon a common design, was originally unlawful. To make the prisoner a principal, the jury must be satisfied that, when he and his companion went out with a common guilty purpose of committing the felony of stealing apples, they also entertained the common guilty purpose of resisting to death, or with extreme violence, any persons who might endeavour to apprehend them; but if they had only the common purpose of stealing apples, and the violence of the prisoner's companion was merely the result of the situation in which he found himself, and proceeded from the impulse of the moment, without any previous concert [the secondary party would be acquitted]. [Emphasis added.] Collison is similar, factually, to Foster's orchard example, and suffers from the same difficulty concerning the probability of murder being committed (if that test had begun to filter into aiding and abetting). [I]f several persons act together in pursuance of a common intent, every act done in furtherance of such intent by each of them is, in law, done by all. The act, however, must be done in pursuance of the common intent. If several men were to intend and agree together to frighten a constable, and one were to shoot him through the head, such an act would affect the individual only by whom it was done.
There is no requirement, here, to show that a collateral offence was more than a probable consequence (assuming that deliberate, as opposed to panicked, shooting is not a probable consequence of frightening) of the execution of the common purpose. All that is clear is that an action completely divorced from the initial "common intent" was not something to which secondary liability would attach. If one is not distracted by the word "intent" (still used loosely at the time), this view is consistent with the older authorities, and the existence of a (harsh) PAL doctrine. [I]f two persons are engaged in the pursuit of an unlawful object … and in the pursuit of that common object, one of them does an act which … amounts to murder in him, it is murder in the other also. The cases which have been referred to by the prisoner's counsel [Howell, and Foster's orchard example] may be explained in this way. The object for which the parties went out was comparatively a trifling one, and it is almost impossible to suppose that if one had committed a murder while engaged in pursuit of such an object, the act could have been done in furtherance of the common object they had in view, which was comparatively so unimportant.
In short, the probability of violence being used was relevant not to an intention to encourage or assist it, but simply in working out whether it was committed in pursuit of the original common purpose.
Further support for this view comes from R. v Harrington, 93 where Martin B simply asked the jury if the death had occurred in pursuit of the common purpose to commit a breach 89 At 450 (emphasis added). 90 See, e. of the peace and assault. Harrington was cited in the 1896 edition of Russell on Crime as an example of when a common purpose to resist oppressors was established, 94 when there is no mention in the report of any purpose to do more than breach the peace and commit an assault.
It is at least possible, then, that the common "resolution" was, in fact, determined by something other than (so to speak) actual intention, perhaps even the probability assessment that was already employed in relation to accessories before the fact. This was muddled by talk of probable consequences being within a "common purpose", which meant some collateral (i.e. unintended) offences were artificially brought within a "common purpose" that did not exist factually. This confusion is not unexpected. Intention would have been presumed on the basis of probable consequences of the defendant's acts, and so references to "resolutions" or "intentions" must be read in that light. It was certainly not clear, by the mid-nineteenth century, that anything more demanding than contemplation of the principal's probable collateral crime was required. 95 Even contemplation might have been unnecessary, if collateral offending was probable.
The second half of the nineteenth century, following the passing of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, saw little clarity added. In R. v Franz, 96 the jury was directed that it had to be sure that, in the light of all the evidence, a murder was committed to enable the planned burglary, or any other felony, before the parties were all liable for it as secondary parties. The reporters record that the doctrine that simply being involved in the burglary was enough to secure liability for additional offences was "long since exploded". 97 But that doctrine, influenced strongly by the harshest incarnation of the felony murder rule, had since been supplemented by ones asking if the collateral offence was in pursuit of the common purpose and, at least in the cases of counselling and procuring, one asking whether the collateral offending was a probable outcome of pursuing the common purpose. Even if the reporters' posited "active or passive" participation in the collateral crime was meant as an additional ingredient of liability, it is not clear what it required. Could it be satisfied by contemplation of the need to cause such injury, as some previous cases can be read to suggest? Finally, it will be noted that the "resolution" in Franz (to inflict injury) is less demanding than the one in Collison (to use "extreme violence" or kill Other authorities are harder to explain. For example, the footnoted commentary to R. v Luck explains that the law's approach was more "humane" by 1862, because there had to be "a common design to commit a felony, and a felony homicidal in nature and likely to lead to homicide". 99 Similarly, in R. v Turner, Channell B held that there must be a common purpose to use "murderous violence" before all parties could be liable for murder. 100 There is still no indication, however, of how these cases built on the approach developed in the eighteenth century. The footnote in Luck speaks, for example, of felonies "likely to lead to homicide", suggesting that a probability focus was beginning to seep into cases involving principals in the second degree. Turner is harder to square with a probability-based analysis, but the matter of how a common purpose to use "murderous violence" was to be proved was unaddressed.
All that was clear was that if the common purpose was to beat the victim, but the principal produced and used a knife, which the other parties did not know about, only the principal was liable for murder. 101 That analysis is consistent, however, with a probability-based account of PAL: murder was less likely to flow from a beating than from a knife attack.
Later cases are, admittedly, difficult to fit into the probability assessment model of PAL, suggesting it might have remained limited to counselling and procuring. In R. v Skeet, Pollock CB noted that there could be secondary liability "where all the parties were aware that deadly weapons are taken with a view to inflict death or commit felonious violence, if resistance is offered". 102 "Awareness" is, however, a loose term. 103 A person is not only aware of a possible outcome if she intends that possible outcome (I can be aware that someone might die if I x simply by believing that to be a possible, if unlikely, result of x-ing). This casts doubt on the claim in Jogee that a discrete intention to assist or encourage the principal's collateral offending was required. Mere awareness was apparently sufficient to establish a "felonious design to carry out the unlawful purpose at all hazards, and whatever may be the consequences", 104 suggesting that the "common design/intention" was (still) a construct, and its limits were set sometimes by probability and other times by contemplation.
105
The way in which Skeet was interpreted in contemporary secondary sources is instructive. For example, the 1867 edition of Archbold states that: "it is not sufficient that the common purpose is merely unlawful; it must either be felonious, or if it be to commit a misdemeanor, then there must be evidence to show that the parties engaged intended to carry it out at all hazards". 106 The use of "either" here suggests that if Offence A was a felony, then, liability for murder could flow in the absence of a common resolve to resist at all costs (perhaps a simple application of felony murder). There was thus no universal requirement of intention to assist or encourage collateral offending. If this was an erroneous statement of the law, it was not corrected, even by the time of the 26 th edition, published in 1922. 107 The Supreme Court/Privy Council based its account of the nineteenth century law on only five of the above-mentioned cases (Collison, Macklin, Luck, Turner and Skeet). Enough has been done to suggest that these cases were "exceptional", 108 "progressive" 109 statements of the law, unclear in their precise implications, and unrepresentative of the entirety of contemporary jurisprudence. Indeed, by the close of the nineteenth century, it appeared that probability/foreseeability was becoming a standard test, beyond cases of counselling and procuring. In 1877, for instance, Russell on Crime recorded that a party would be liable for collateral offences that he "ought to have known" would follow from the common purpose.
110
Although perhaps "editorial kite-flying", 111 this statement remained in subsequent editions and is found in the 1950 edition, edited by arch "subjectivist" J.W.C. Turner.
112
The English attempts at codification also suggest that "objective" probability, rather than intention, was assuming core importance. 113 The and what ought to have been foreseen by the parties as probable. 119 These codes were also thought to be rationalisations of existing English law, 120 suggesting further that probability was considered to be the overarching test in establishing whether a collateral offence was (at least in legal fiction, if not in fact) included within the parties' common purpose.
Significantly, the Codes deal with ordinary accessorial liability separately from common purpose scenarios, rendering the argument that ordinary aiding and abetting could suffice for all scenarios (which is, ultimately, the Supreme Court/Privy Council's thesis) questionable.
It is submitted that, once a proper view is taken of the nineteenth century authorities, a "subjective" element (but not necessarily intention to encourage or assist all of the principal's offences, at least as the word intention is nowadays understood) was beginning to be insisted upon by some judges, but it was not consistently explained in terms of intention, rather than contemplation. Furthermore, intention was used loosely, and often in conjunction with probability assessments, in the nineteenth century. It is difficult to take much from them, and certainly very difficult, when everything is taken into consideration, to divine a consistent trend of authority requiring an intention to assist or encourage each of the principal's offences.
The next section will demonstrate that the twentieth century cases suggest a move to greater "subjectivity" (in conjunction with the defendant's ability to give evidence at trial), but not necessarily towards intentional encouragement or assistance of each of the principal's offences. It will be argued that the move was more clearly towards "subjective" foresight of collateral offences, culminating in Chan Wing-Siu. 
VI. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (TO CHAN WING-SIU)
As in the nineteenth century, most early twentieth-century cases were vague on the requirements of secondary liability. 121 The law's development in common purpose scenarios remained "erratic". 122 Far from being directed precisely on the parties' "subjective"
intentions, juries were still told to establish the scope of the parties' "unlawful design" with little (recorded) guidance on how to do so.
123
Where guidance was given to juries about collateral offending, it does not necessarily support the Supreme Court/Privy Council's view of history. In R. v Pridmore, the trial judge directed the jury that the defendant was liable for collateral offences that "naturally follow"
124 from pursuing an agreement to poach. Phillimore J disagreed, and suggested that there needed to be a common purpose that included the intention to resist opposition, rather than merely poach. 125 Yet it remained unclear what was required to establish such a common purpose, and the trial judge's comments about the secondary parties' "realisation" of the principal's potential collateral offending were not criticised. Ultimately, the way in which the secondary party held his stick (aggressively, it appears) was taken to be evidence enough of the common purpose to use force.
126
To add to the interpretational difficulties, it is unclear from Pridmore how much force the secondary party had to have (implicitly) appreciated was part of the common purpose.
127
It is not clear that the "common purpose" (however established) had to stretch to serious violence or lethal force in order to affix liability for murder, as Collison had suggested. If it did not have to stretch that far, then, structurally, Pridmore can be read consistently with the existence of PAL: intentional encouragement of the use of (some) force (Offence A) could ground liability for a collateral murder that the secondary parties did not intend to encourage or assist (Offence B). 121 Admittedly, Collison's requirement of a resolution to resist opposition was adopted as an aspect of the offence of rioting, but that is irrelevant to the requirements of secondary liability. Pridmore can be compared with R. v Pearce, 128 where the jury was told it would have to find an "arrangement" to use force if disturbed, and the existence of a common purpose "not merely to poach, but also to resist apprehension at all costs, even by violence if necessary", 129 if it was to convict. The defendant had run away when his group was disturbed, and there was a concern that the trial judge had "misled" the jury to think that "the mere fact 132 and the presumption of intention from natural and probable consequences still applied. 133 Judges were thus not as careful to distinguish between intention/foresight and probability/foreseeability. Judicial comments must therefore be read cautiously.
Contemporary textbooks fail to resolve matters, even if they broadly support the need for a common purpose to resist opposition with force in (at least some) murder cases. For instance, the 1926 edition of Kenny's Outlines states that: 134 An aider and abettor is only liable for such crimes committed by the principal in the first degree as were done in execution of their common purpose. Thus if burglars find themselves interrupted by the master of the house which they have broken into, and one of them shoots him, the other burglar [not be] liable for this murder, unless they had jointly resolved to resist interruption at any cost. [Emphasis added.] No relevant cases are cited in support of this proposition, and there is no discussion of what this common resolution involved in terms of proof. Other secondary sources from the 1920s suggest that contemplation of the collateral offence was vital in such cases involving aiders and abettors, yet do not say that this was mere evidence that the secondary party had intentionally encouraged or assisted the collateral offence 135 (which is what the Supreme Court/Privy Council suggested that it was).
136
Despite these moves in the direction of "subjectivity", traces of the "objective", probability-based approach occurred relatively far into the twentieth century in cases involving principals in the second degree (aiders and abettors authorities and an obiter comment, it was at least possible that, by the mid 1950s, mere contemplation of the collateral crime was beginning to be required to bring an act within the parties' (constructed) common purpose. On the argument defended in this article, there had never been strong recognition of the need to prove that a secondary party intended to encourage or assist all of the principal's crimes, and so no climb-down to contemplation/foresight occurred.
Indeed, the view that the requisite "subjective" element was only just beginning to form by the 1950s might explain why references to probability persevered. In R. All Smith did, if the argument presented above is accepted, is give support to the developing line of authority that mere probability of collateral offending was no longer enough for PAL, and that contemplation/foresight of the collateral crime was necessary. 160 The trial judge's statements regarding intention are -on this view -to be treated with extreme care. 161 Just because the trial judge said "intention" (still, at that time, presumed from "objective" probability) was required, does not mean that that was the minimum level of fault consistent with secondary liability. The decision was read at the time to suggest that contemplation of the collateral offence was necessary and sufficient. 162 If a contemplation/foresight-based rot did set in during the twentieth century, then, this happened long before 1984.
163
In the second five-judge decision, R. v Anderson and Morris, 164 the court approved the contention of Geoffrey Lane QC (later Lord Lane CJ) that the scope of the "joint enterprise"
was crucial to establishing secondary liability, 165 but said nothing about how it was to be established. 166 The question is not answered in Anderson and Morris, 167 which was mainly about unforeseeable changes to the common plan by the principal -which would relieve the putative secondary party of liability. But unforeseeable collateral offending would not even have fallen within the probability-based version of PAL that had existed (initially perhaps only in relation to counselling and procuring) from around the late seventeenth century, never mind the contemplation/foresight-based version that was developing (if falteringly) by the 1960s. It is noteworthy that emphasis was placed in Anderson and Morris on whether the principal "acted in a way which no party to [the] common design could suspect". 168 Again, it is not clear if suspicion would have been sufficient fault to bring the principal's offending within the responsibility of the secondary party, but it is not ruled out.
Following the demise of the presumption of intention and foresight from probable consequences (October 1967), 169 and the abolition of the accessories before the fact/principals in the second degree distinction (January 1968), 170 it might be expected that the law's approach would at last become consistent, but it did not. In R. v Lovesay, 171 for example, liability required a "common design … [to use] whatever force was necessary to achieve the robbers' object", 172 but it seemed to be enough that the defendant "envisaged" that resistance would need to be overcome. 173 That said, neither the decided cases, nor contemporary secondary literature, 174 are crystal clear.
Indeed, some cases do appear to insist on an intention to encourage or assist each of the principal's offences. In R. v Reid, Lawton LJ held that:
175
When two or more men go out together in joint possession of offensive weapons such as revolvers and knives and the circumstances are such as to justify an inference that the very least they intend to do with them is to use them to cause fear in another, there is … always a likelihood that in the excitement and tensions of the occasion, one of them will use his weapon in some way which will cause death or serious injury. If such injury was not intended by the others, they must be acquitted of murder; but having started out on an enterprise which envisaged some degree of violence, albeit nothing more than causing fright, they will be guilty of manslaughter. [Emphasis added.] Reid appears to be strong support for the Supreme Court/Privy Council's argument that, prior to 1984, secondary parties had to intend to encourage or assist, and actually encourage or assist, each of the principal's offences. 176 The court's decision in Reid was, however, viewed by J.C. Smith at the time as merely being "in accordance with the established law" described in the third edition of Smith and Hogan. 177 There, it is said that if the secondary party expected the principal to use the knife with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, that was murder, 178 and the importance of foresight of the principal's crime was emphasised, but not connected (at least explicitly) with a requirement of intention. 179 Once again, it is not clear that intentional assistance or encouragement of Offence B was, in the end, required.
Other authorities from around the same period support the view that contemplation or foresight of the principal's crime could be sufficient to secure secondary liability. In R. v Penfold, 180 Shaw LJ noted that the defendants could "hardly fail to contemplate" the necessity of violence, and they had implicitly agreed "to put themselves under the dictates of any arising necessity". 181 It remained unclear whether this contemplation was a necessary and sufficient condition of liability. Although an alternative reading of the case is that the secondary parties had accepted that violence was indeed what they were planning (and "conditionally intended" it), contemplation of violence could well have been necessary and sufficient to affix liability. This dubiety is sufficient to cast doubt on the Supreme Court/Privy
Council's historical account. Chan Wing-Siu could, on this contemplation-as-sufficient view,
simply have confirmed what, by the late 1970s, was the best gloss put on the cases regarding common unlawful purpose. 182 The law had narrowed after the sixteenth century's harsh approach, from concentrating on probable crimes committed in pursuit of the common purpose (through the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries -initially in counselling and procuring, and later generally) to contemplated crimes committed in pursuit of the common purpose. In another sense, the law's reach had broadened, in that possible (even if not probable) foreseen collateral crimes were seemingly included.
This question of possibility versus probability was addressed first in Australia. In R. v Johns, 183 Barwick CJ contended that the parties' common purpose included "all those contingencies which can be held to have been in the contemplation of the participants, or which in the circumstances ought necessarily to have been in such contemplation." 184 The defence conceded that contemplation of Offence B was enough, but objected to contemplation of a possibility being sufficient. 185 It was concluded that it was. 186 The Supreme Court/Privy intentional encouragement/assistance of the collateral crime, thus rendering PAL conceptually identical to ordinary aiding and abetting (and redundant). Many would have viewed such a judicial change as desirable, regarding PAL -a judicial development -as the genesis of much injustice. 213 Being explicit about the change would, however, have meant engaging more directly with the proper process of revisiting previous decisions, 214 and raised more clearly constitutional concerns about judicial activism. Although the Supreme Court/Privy Council is no doubt right that corrections of clear common law "errors" are largely unproblematic constitutionally, 215 there are clearer concerns raised by more substantive reform of even the common law 216 (as the prosecution maintained in Jogee). 217 The reasons the change in Jogee is problematic, once the alleged precedential "error" has been exposed as a smokescreen, are as follows: (i) the law as stated (defensibly, as shown above) in Chan Wing-Siu had been relatively settled for over 30 years; (ii) requiring intentional encouragement or assistance for all secondary liability was not a reform the Law Commission had proposed when it had considered accessorial liability; 218 and (iii) Parliament had not apparently contemplated reforming the law, despite recent encouragement to do so. 219 Once that shield of precedent and history has been shattered, the question is whether the other reasons provided by the Supreme Court/Privy Council in Jogee 220 justified such dramatic law reform being undertaken by the courts, not the legislature. It is unfortunate that this question was so easily avoided in
Jogee, but this paper opens up the possibility for it to be addressed more straightforwardly in the future. Jogee should be seen for what it is: significant judicial law reform, not common law housekeeping.
